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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 as this case
was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court on or about
September 7, 2010. (R. 189-190).*
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue #1.

According to Utah law, the entry of a Default and a Default

Judgment are appropriate when a party has failed to timely plead and when the plaintiffs
damages are supported by evidence. In this case, a Default was inappropriately entered
because Appellant/Defendant, Benjamin Chavez ("Chavez") filed an Answer and because
Appellee/Plaintiff, Ray Salazar's ("Salazar") damage claims are ambiguous and
unsupported by evidence. When Chavez learned of the entry of the Default Judgment, he
promptly filed a motion to have the Default Judgment set aside, thereby preserving the
issue in the Trial Court. (R. 61-63).
Standard of Review.

Questions of whether the Court correctly interpreted and

applied the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are questions of law, reviewed for correctness.
See USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, If 27, 235 P.3d 749.

References to "R" refer to the pages of the original record, paginated pursuant to
UtahR.App.P. 11(b).
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Issue #2.

According to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), the Trial Court erred in its denial of

Chavez's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (the "Motion"). The issue of whether the
Trial Court's ruling was proper was preserved when Chavez filed the Motion. (R. 6163).
Standard of Review. Questions regarding whether or not the Trial Court erred in
denying a Rule 60(b) motion are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App. 110, f 8, 2 P.3d 451.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(D) - See Addendum.
2. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) - See Addendum.
3. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(2) - See Addendum.
4. Utah R. Civ. P. 55 - See Addendum.
5. Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d) - See Addendum.
6. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) - See Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case stems from an altercation between Salazar and Chavez wherein Salazar
alleges he sustained certain injuries resulting in medical expenses, lost income, and pain
and suffering. Chavez contends that Salazar was the instigator of this altercation and
argues that Salazar's medical bills were paid by Medicaid, that Salazar was unemployed,
and that Salazar should reimburse Chavez for certain damages resulting from the
altercation.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court
Salazar filed a Complaint against Chavez on or about August 20, 2008. (R. 1-6).
On or about September 23, 2008, Chavez filed an Answer. (R. 7). On August 11, 2009,
the Trial Court dismissed the case because the parties failed to respond to the Trial
Court's order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. (R. 25-27). On
August 26, 2009, the Trial Court reopened the case and entered a Default and a Default
Judgment against Chavez claiming that Chavez had failed to file an Answer. (R. 51-57).
On June 11, 2010, Chavez filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. (R. 61-63).
The Court denied Chavez's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment in a Minute Entry on
July 29, 2010. (R. 177-178). On August 30, 2010, Chavez filed his Notice of Appeal.
(R. 180-181). On November 16, 2010, the Trial Court entered an Order stating that the
July 29, 2010 Minute Entry Decision is and was a final, appealable Order. (R. 191-195).
Statement of the Facts
1. Salazar filed a Complaint against Chavez on or about August 20, 2008, (the
"Complaint") alleging that he sustained injuries from a physical altercation with
Appellant (the "Civil Case"). (R. 1-6).
2. Salazar alleges that Chavez attempted to run him over in his truck and that Chavez
cut Salazar's arm with a machete. (R. 1-6).
3. Salazar sought "medical expenses in excess of $10,000.00 and continued medical
expenses for rehabilitation," lost wages of $13.00 per hour or approximately $25,000.00
per year and pain and discomfort in an unspecified amount, as well as court costs and
other relief that the Trial Court deemed reasonable. (R. 1-6).
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4.

On September 23, 2008, Chavez, acting pro se, filed his Answer. (R. 7).

5.

In his Answer, Chavez stated that Salazar attacked Chavez, that Salazar threw a

brick at Chavez's car, and that Salazar cut his own arm on a jagged edge of Chavez's
vehicle. Chavez also argued that Salazar's medical bills were covered by Medicaid and
that at the time of the altercation, Salazar was not employed. Chavez also sought
reimbursement from Salazar for damages Salazar caused to Chavez's vehicle, for the cost
of retrieving Chavez's truck from impound, and for Chavez's pain and suffering for the
time Chavez spent incarcerated as a result of the altercation. (R. 7).
6.

In December, 2008, the State of Utah brought a criminal case against Chavez in

connection with the altercation (the "Criminal Case"). Chavez was represented by Teresa
Welch in the Criminal Case. (R. 115-118).
7.

Despite Chavez having filed his Answer in the Civil Case, Salazar, on January 5,

2009, filed a Motion for Substituted Service of Process. (R. 8-10).
8.

Salazar's Motion for Substituted Service of Process was accompanied by the

affidavit of Salazar's counsel, David K. Smith. (R. 11-18).
9.

Mr. Smith stated that "[t]he constable was unable to serve the Defendant at [his

last known address, known to the Plaintiff, at 845 West Fayette Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah]," and "the constable was told the Defendant had moved ...." (R. 12).
10. On January 7, 2009, the Trial Court, in its Minute Entry, stated, "it appears that
Defendant has actual knowledge of this lawsuit in as much as he filed an answer on
September 23, 2008." The Trial Court then, inexplicably, authorized service by
publication. (R. 19).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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11. On July 9, 2009, the Trial Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the Civil
Case should not be dismissed. (R. 25-26).
12. On August 6, 2009, Chavez waived his right to a preliminary hearing in the
Criminal Case pursuant to a proposed resolution by the Prosecutor. In fine tuning the
details of the proposed resolution, Ms. Welch requested that the Prosecutor provide
information regarding the amount of restitution sought. (R. 116).
13. Several months passed before Ms. Welch heard back from the Prosecutor
regarding restitution. (R. 116).
14. In the Civil Case, a hearing date of August 10, 2009, was set for the parties to
appear regarding the Trial Court's Order to Show Cause. (R. 25-26).
15. Neither Chavez, Salazar, nor his counsel, Mr. Smith, appeared at the hearing
before the Trial Court on August 10, 2009. (R. 27).
16. On August 11, 2009, the Trial Court dismissed the Civil Case for failure to
prosecute. (R. 25-27).
17. On August 24, 2009, Salazar moved the Trial Court to reopen the Civil Case. (R.
28-35).
18. On that same day, August 24, 2009, Mr. Smith claims to have served, by mail, a
proposed Default Certificate and a proposed Default Judgment. (R. 51-56).
19. On August 25, 2009, the Trial Court signed the Default Judgment which was
entered on August 26, 2009. (R. 51 -53).
20. The Default Judgment awards Salazar $29,120, comprised of $6,000 for medical
expenses, $3,120 for lost income, and $20,000 for pain and suffering. (R. 51-53).

DMWEST #7992057 v9
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21. On August 26, 2009, the Trial Court signed and entered the Default Certificate.
(R. 54-56).
22. The Trial Court stated that the Default Certificate was entered because "no answer
or other pleading ha[d] been filed ...." (R. 54).
23. However, on that same day, August 26, 2009, the Trial Court granted Salazar's
Motion to Reopen the Case, citing Chavez's Answer as proof that the "[Servicemembers'
Civil Relief Act] SCRA does not apply." (R. 57).
24. In or about December 2009, Ms. Welch received an email from the Prosecutor
notifying her that Default Judgment had been entered against Chavez in the amount of
$29,120 in the Civil Case. This surprised Ms. Welch as she was unaware of any other
pending legal proceedings against Chavez. (R. 116).
25. In approximately January 2010, Ms. Welch inquired further regarding the Default
Judgment during a telephone conversation with the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor informed
Ms. Welch that Chavez's default had been entered in connection with the Civil Case,
which Ms. Welch did not know existed. (R. 116).
26. Ms. Welch attempted to contact Chavez to inform him of the Default Judgment.
However, Ms. Welch was unable to contact Chavez as she had an incorrect telephone
number for him. (R. 116).
27. On approximately March 29, 2010, Ms. Welch spoke to Chavez and informed him
of the Default Judgment. (R. 116).
28. Chavez was not aware that the Default Judgment had been sought or entered
against him until March 29, 2010 when Ms. Welch informed him of its entry. (R. 120).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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29. When Chavez learned of the Default Judgment he sought counsel and retained the
undersigned counsel on or about April 14, 2010. (R. 120).
30. On June 7, 2010, in the Criminal Case, the Court held a sentencing hearing for
Chavez. The sentencing hearing was to address, among other things, how much, if any,
restitution Chavez owed. (R. 117; R. 120).
31. Chavez desired a ruling regarding restitution in the Criminal Case prior to
requesting that the Default Judgment be set aside in the Civil Case, so that any ruling in
the Civil Case would not affect the Court's ruling in the Criminal Case. (R. 121).
32. On June 11, 2010, Chavez filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (the
"Motion to Set Aside"), a supporting memorandum, and the supporting declarations of
Teresa Welch and Benjamin Chavez. (R. 61-121).
33. On July 29, 2010, the Trial Court denied the Motion to Set Aside. (R. 177-178).
34. The July 29, 2010, Minute Entry Decision states:
[T]here is no explanation in the case record for why a default
certificate and default judgment were signed given that the
docket clearly showed that Defendant had filed an answer
almost a year earlier.
The fact that default judgment should not have been entered
does not, however, warrant setting it aside under the facts of
this case.
(R. 177).
35. On August 30, 2010, Chavez filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 180-181).
36. On November 16, 2010, the Trial Court entered an Order stating that the July 29,
2010, Minute Entry Decision is and was a final, appealable Order. (R. 191-195).

DMWEST #7992057 v9
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The Trial Court erred in entering Default and Default Judgment against Chavez
because Chavez filed a timely Answer in this matter. According to the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, an Answer is a pleading and its timely filing precludes the entry of
Default and Default Judgment.
The Trial Court further erred in its award of damages because the Complaint does
not request a sum certain or a calculable sum certain and no evidence was offered or
admitted supporting the damage award. According to Utah Law, such an award is
reversible error regardless of the timeliness of an appellants prior motion. Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b).
Because of the Trial Court's errors, Chavez filed a timely Motion to Set Aside the
Default Judgment. The Court, however, denied the Motion citing Chavez's alleged
failure to serve the Answer on opposing counsel and alleged failure to keep the Trial
Court apprised of his current address. Chavez disputes the Court's findings and argues
that, regardless of these findings, such minor procedural infractions do not warrant the
sanction of a default judgment, especially against &pro se litigant who is afforded leeway
on the Court's procedural rules.
The Trial Court has admitted that the entry of Default and the Default Judgment
were erroneous, even opining as to its confusion as to how such occurred given the
obvious filing of Chavez's Answer. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, public policy,
and equity all mandate the setting aside of the Default, and the vacating of the Default
Judgment so that the matter can be remanded and heard on the merits.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A DEFAULT CERTIFICATE
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST CHAVEZ.
A.

Chavez Filed An Answer, Thereby Precluding His Default.

The Default and Default Judgment should not have been entered against Chavez
because he timely plead by filing his Answer. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a). Rule 55 states:
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief
is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided
by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall
enter the default of that party.
Utah R. Civ. P. 55(a). Salazar filed the Complaint on August 20, 2008. (R. 1-6). On September
23, 2008, Chavez filed his pro se Answer in this matter. (R. 7).
Rule 55 only permits the clerk of the Trial Court to enter a party's default if said party
failed to plead. Utah R. Civ. P. 55(a). Accordingly, the Trial Court's entry of Default and
Default Judgment against Chavez was improper because Chavez filed a responsive pleading. In
fact, the Trial Court readily admits that the Default Judgment was an error. The Court stated:
[TJhere is no explanation in the case record for why a default
certificate and default judgment were signed given that the
docket clearly showed that Defendant had filed an answer
almost a year earlier.
(R. 177).
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the entry of Default is improper when an answer
has been filed. In P & B Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, the defendant appealed the Trial Court's
striking of his answer and entering default judgment against him. 751 P.2d 274, 276 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988). The Utah Court of Appeals determined that the striking of the defendant's answer
was improper and that, accordingly, the entry of partial default judgment against the defendant

DMWEST #7992057 v9
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was, likewise, improper. Id. at 277. The Court stated, "[t]he entry of a default judgment by a
court with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, where there is no default in law or
in fact, is regarded as improper or illegal, and voidable." Id.
Likewise, in this case, because Chavez filed an Answer, the entry of the Default
Judgment against him is improper, illegal, and should be voided. The Court should set aside the
entry of Default, vacate the Default Judgment, and remand the case to be heard on its merits.
B.

The Trial Court's Damage Award Fails To Comply With Rules 54 and 55
Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure.

The Trial Court erred in entering the Default and Default Judgment against Chavez
because Salazar's Complaint requests speculative damages, and Salazar presented no evidence to
prove or support his damage claims. Rule 54 states, "[a] judgment by default shall not be
different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for
judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(2). Furthermore, Rule 55 states as follows:
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as
follows:
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk
shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against
the defendant if:
***

(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain
or for a sum that can be made certain by computation.
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a
judgment by default shall apply to the court therefore. If, in
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into
effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment
by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter,
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references
as it deems necessary and proper.
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A plaintiff cannot merely obtain a default judgment and an award for damages
unsupported by evidence. Indeed, Utah courts have stated "it is [ ] incumbent upon the
non-defaulting party to establish by competent evidence the amount of recoverable
damages and costs he claims." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). Additionally, "[t]o enter a default judgment for unliquidated damages, a
judge must review the complaint, determine whether the allegations state a valid claim
for relief, and award damages in an amount that is supported by some valid evidence"
Lee v. Langley, 2005 UT App 339, \ 24 n. 4, 121 P.3d 33 (quoting Skanchy v. Calcados
Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added)).
The Utah Supreme Court remanded a case, requiring that the Trial Court hold a
hearing, where a plaintiff obtained default judgment, but the Trial Court did not take
evidence regarding the reasonableness of the amount of damages. Specifically, in Larsen
v. Collina, the plaintiff brought a paternity suit against the defendant and sought damages
of $4,946.00 in unpaid child support and $183.00 per month in continuing support. See
684 P.2d 52, 53-54 (Utah 1984). The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the
defendant as a sanction for the defendant's failure to answer interrogatories. Id. at 54.
The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing, stating that "[t]he amount of
damages requested here was neither a sum certain nor a sum readily calculable, and the
court did not take evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount." Id. at 56.
Similarly, in Russell v. Martell, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against
one of the defendants and that defendant subsequently filed a motion to have the default
judgment set aside. See 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984). According to the plaintiff, the

DMWEST #7992057 v9
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defendant had acted as a securities agent without being registered and was guilty of
violations of the Utah's Securities Act. Id. at 1195. The plaintiff was, according to the
statute, entitled to the recovery of the consideration paid for the security. Id. Despite
finding that the defendant had failed to timely bring a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, and finding
that the defendant's claims did not meet section 60(b)(7),2 the Court reversed the
judgment. Id. at 1196. The Court stated:
[T]he judgment against [the defendant] must be reversed
because of the failure of the Trial Court to follow Rule
55(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(c)(2)
and Rule 55 describes the procedure to be followed by Trial
Courts in entering judgments against defaulting parties.
Courts are not at liberty to deviate from those rules just
because one party is in default and is not entitled to be heard
on the merits of the case. For example, Rule 54(c)(2)
provides that a judgment by default may not be different in
kind from or exceed in amount that specifically prayed for in
the demand for judgment. Another rule governing the entry
of default judgment is Rule 55(b)(2), which is applicable in
the instant case. It provides that when the plaintiff s claim is
for other than a sum certain or an amount that by computation
can be made certain judgment by default may not be entered
by the clerk of the court, but must be entered by the court,
which may conduct such hearings and take such evidence as
is necessary to determine the damages . .. [T]he plaintiffs'
claims for damages against [the defendant] were not for sums
certain and under Rule 55(b)(1) a hearing should have been
conducted by the trial court to ascertain the amount of the
damages to which the plaintiffs were entitled.
Id. at 1195. Further, the Court held that "evidence should have been adduced as to the
amount of income, if any, the plaintiff had received on the security ... so that it could be
deducted in the calculation of the plaintiffs' damages." Id. at 1195-96.
Now Rule 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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In this case, Salazar's Complaint prays for the following damages:
1. For damages for loss of income according to proof.
2. For damages for medical expenses according to proof.
3. For reasonable and necessary future medical expenses as
may be shown at the time of trial.
4. For loss of future earning capacity.
5. For damages for permanent partial impairment sustained
by the Plaintiff.
6. For interest on any special damages at the legal rate from
the date those expenses were incurred.
7. For damages for pain and suffering.
8. For costs of the Court.
9. For such other and further relief as the court may appear
just and reasonable in the premises.
(R. 3-4). None of Salazar's damages are for "a sum certain or for a sum that can be made
certain by computation." Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)(D). And, as admitted in the
Complaint, Salazar is required to introduce evidence to support his damage claims. As
the Record clearly manifests, Salazar has failed to provide any evidence to support his
medical expenses, lost wages, and/or his pain and suffering. Additionally, Chavez has
incorrectly been precluded from presenting evidence of payments offsetting Salazar's
claims. Accordingly, the Trial Court's damage award to Salazar is in err and should be
vacated.3

As discussed below, the Court should set aside the Default Judgment regardless of
the Court's decision regarding Chavez's Rule 60(b) motion. See Russell v. Martell, 681
P.2d 1193, 1195-96 (Utah 1984).

DMWEST #7992057 v9
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING CHAVEZ'S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Because the Default Judgment was incorrectly entered against Chavez, the Trial
Court's subsequent denial of Chavez's Motion to Set Aside was likewise, improper and
in error. Rule 60 provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment... for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud,. .. misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
The rule further states that motions predicated on subdivision (6) shall "be made
within a reasonable time." Id. Utah courts have held that the "any other reason justifying
relief subdivision embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (5); second that the reason justify relief; and
third, that the motion be made within a reasonable time. Richins v. Delbert Chipman &
Sons, Inc., 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Laub v. South Cent. Utah
Tel Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-07 (Utah 1982)). Additionally, u[a]n 'entry of default'
may be set aside under rule 55(c) 'for good cause shown by the court.'" Calder Bros. Co.
v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926 n.4 (Utah 1982) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 55). Because
Mr. Chavez has met the requirements above, there was good cause to set aside the
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Default. Further, public policy favors setting aside default judgments. See Heathman v.
Fabian & Clendenin, 311 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962) ("Judgments by default are not
favored by the courts nor are they in the interest of justice and fair play .... The courts, in
the interest ofjustice and fair play, favor, where possible, a foil and complete opportunity
for a hearing on the merits of every case.") Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in not
granting the Motion to Set Aside.
First, the basis for the Motion to Set Aside was unique and distinct from the
reasons articulated in subdivisions (1) through (5) of Rule 60(b) and there was
justification for the relief sought. Default should not have been entered in this matter
because Chavez submitted a pro se Answer to the Complaint. (R. 7; R. 120). The Trial
Court even acknowledged Chavez's Answer in its January 7, 2009 Minute Entry as well
as its August 2, 2010 Minute Entry. (R. 19 ("[I]t appears Defendant has actual
knowledge of this lawsuit in as much as he filed an answer on September 23, 2008.");
R. 177 ("[T]he docket clearly showed that Defendant had filed an answer almost a year
earlier.")). Nonetheless, the Court entered Default Judgment and signed the Default
Certificate against Chavez, incorrectly stating that more than 30 days had elapsed since
the date of the last publication and no answer or other pleading had been filed. (R. 5156). The Default Judgment awarded Salazar $29,120.00, comprised of $6,000.00 for
medical expenses, $3,120.00 for lost income and $20,000.00 for pain and suffering. (R.
51-53). Simply put, this entry of Default is incorrect and the Court should set it aside.
Second, the Motion to Set Aside was made within a reasonable time under Rule
60. Utah courts have held that a motion filed within about one month after learning that

DMWEST #7992057 v9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
15Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

judgment was entered was timely under Rule 60(b). Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802
P.2d 749, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Moreover, when determining notice of judgment,
the Court looks at when the party actually discovers the default. See, e.g., Workman, 802
P.2d at 752; U.S. Bank NA. v. Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 995 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). Mr.
Chavez did not receive "actual" notice until March 29, 2010. (R. 120).
Indeed, Chavez's attorney in the Criminal Case, Ms. Welch, did not learn about
the entry of Default Judgment in the Civil Case until January 2010, when Ms. Welch
spoke to the Prosecutor. (R. 116). Ms. Welch then attempted to get a hold of Chavez,
but could not reach him due to an incorrect telephone number on file. (R. 116). It was
not until March 29, 2010 that Ms. Welch spoke with Chavez and informed him that
Default had been entered against him in the Civil Case. (R. 116). Prior to that date,
Chavez had no idea that Default Judgment had been entered, or even requested for that
matter. (R. 117). After learning about the entry of Default, Chavez promptly engaged
undersigned counsel on or about April 14, 2010. (R. 117).4 Because Chavez did not
learn about the entry of Default until March 29, 2010, and due to the sentencing hearing

Additionally, intervening circumstances in the Criminal Case prevented Chavez
from filing the Motion to Set Aside until June 11, 2010. Specifically, the Motion to Set
Aside was not filed until after the Criminal Case Court held the sentencing hearing on
June 7, 2010, because that hearing addressed the specific issue of whether Chavez would
be ordered to pay restitution, and, if so, how much. (R. 117; R. 120-21).) The restitution
at issue in the Criminal Case is identical to the damages sought by Salazar in the Civil
Case, which were awarded by the Default Judgment. (R. 117; R. 121; see also, R. 5153). Chavez desired a ruling regarding restitution in the Criminal Case prior to
requesting that the Default Judgment be set aside in the Civil Case, so that the Civil Case
would not affect the Court's ruling in the Criminal Case. (R. 121).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
n * A \ A / P Q T i*7QQ9HCi7 \/Q

16

in the Criminal Case, which addressed how much restitution Chavez would be ordered to
pay, Chavez could neither respond to the request for Default nor file the Motion to Set
Aside until June 11, 2010. (R. 117; R. 120-21). Certainly, where the Utah Supreme
Court has determined that a motion filed one month after learning about the entry of
default was reasonable, the Motion to Set Aside, filed just over two months after learning
about entry of default, is reasonable. This is particularly true where intervening
circumstances in the Criminal Case prevented Chavez from filing the Motion to Set
Aside until after the sentencing hearing, and in light of the strong public policy in favor
of setting aside default judgment.
The timeliness of Chavez's filing of the Motion to Set Aside is likewise
reasonable given Salazar's failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 5 requires that Chavez be served with "notice of entry of judgment...." Utah R.
Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(D). As is clear from the record, Salazar failed to serve Chavez with notice
of the entry of the Default Judgment. There is no certificate, proof, or affidavit of service
showing Salazar served Chavez with notice of the Default Judgment having been
entered. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Chavez was unaware of the entry of the
Default Judgment.
Ultimately, however, even if the Court finds that Chavez's Motion to Set Aside
was untimely, according to Utah Law, the Court must set aside the Default Judgment
5

Chavez recognizes the inclusion of a certificate of service on the Default and the
Default Judgment, however, such certificates pre-dates the Trial Court's signature and
merely evidences service of the proposed Default and the proposed Default Judgment.

DMWEST #7992057 v9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

because the Default and the Default Judgment were incorrectly entered given Chavez
filed an Answer and because the Default Judgment is not supported by evidence. See
Martell 6&1?.2d at 1195-96.
Finally, as a matter of public policy, the Trial Court should have set aside the
Default. "Judgments by default are not favored by the courts nor are they in the interest
of justice and fair play.. .The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where
possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case."
Heathman, 377 P.2d at 190 (affirming that a default judgment can be set aside on the
grounds of excusable neglect). In fact, "courts generally tend to favor granting relief
from default judgments where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in
substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v.
Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). See also, Wright v.
Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (the law disfavors default judgments).
In the instant case, the interest of justice is met because Salazar will not be
prejudiced by setting aside the Default Judgment. Nothing has happened between the
time Default Judgment was entered and now that would cause prejudice to Salazar. To
the contrary, Chavez will suffer great prejudice from the entry of Default and the Default
Judgment if they are not set aside because Chavez had no opportunity to contest Salazar's
specious claims and damages and is now saddled with a $29,120.00 judgment. The
interests of justice favor setting aside the Default and the Default Judgment so that the
$29,120.00 judgment may be disputed and adjudicated on the merits rather than disposed
of by Default. There is simply no basis for the exorbitant damages claim awarded to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Salazar by Default; Salazar's medical expenses were likely covered by Medicaid and
since Salazar was unemployed for several months prior to the altercation, he has suffered
no lost wages. Additionally, the award Salazar received for pain and suffering is flagrant
given the lack of evidence of any such pain and suffering, the factual dispute over the
events of the altercation and the relatively minor injury sustained. Thus, because Chavez
met the requirements of Rule 60(b) for setting aside the Default and the Default Judgment
and in the interest of justice, the Court should set aside the Default, vacate the Default
Judgment, and remand the Civil Case for an adjudication on the merits.
The Trial Court's July 29, 2010 Minute Entry Decision justifies the denial of
Chavez's Motion to Set Aside by stating:
Still the defendant (a) did not serve his answer on opposing
counsel, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b) did not include any contact information that would allow
the Court (and opposing counsel) the ability to get in touch
with him so prosecution of this case could proceed in a timely
and appropriate way; and (c) never attempted to inform the
Court of his whereabouts or inquire about the status of the
case in the nearly two years since he filed his answer. Any
person who is a party to an action in court has a duty to keep
the Court informed of his whereabouts; this is something that
Defendant utterly failed to do. As a result, defendant bears
significant responsibility for perpetuating the Court's error.
(R. 177-178 (emphasis added.)). Notably, the Court admits its error, but places the blame
on Chavez for its error. Additionally, the Court's findings, are not supported by evidence
and are, accordingly, an abuse of discretion.
The Trial Court concluded that Chavez "did not serve his answer on opposing
counsel, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (R. 177). However, there is
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absolutely no evidence to support this conclusion. In fact, as the Court notes,
"Defendant's 'answer' was addressed to both the Court and Mr. Smith, Plaintiffs
counsel." (R. 177). Accordingly, the only available evidence supports the opposite
conclusion, that Chavez served his Answer on opposing counsel. (R. 7).6
One might infer from Salazar's filing his Motion for Substituted Service that
Salazar's counsel, Mr. Smith, had not been served with Chavez's Answer. However, that
is only one explanation. It is equally as likely that Mr. Smith was served and merely
misplaced, disregarded, etc., the Answer. There is simply no evidence upon which the
Trial Court can base its finding that Chavez failed to serve the Answer on opposing
counsel.
There is nothing in the record that would lead Chavez to believe that the Trial
Court was without his address. There is no evidence that the Trial Court requested
Chavez provide an address. Salazar filed the Complaint on August 20, 2008. (R. 1-6).
Salazar hired a constable to serve a copy of the Complaint and a Summons on Chavez.
(R. 11-18). Chavez received the Complaint and filed his Answer. (R. 7). Having

Chavez admits that certain procedural mistakes were made regarding the service
of his Answer, namely the omission of a standard certificate of seirvice. However, pro se
litigants should be "accorded every consideration that may reasonably be indulged," and
the Trial Court should be loath to sanction Chavez for a procedural misstep here or there.
Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, H 3, 67 P.3d 1000 (citations omitted). This omission
hardly justifies the sanction of a default judgment.
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received the Complaint, Chavez had no reason to believe that either Salazar, Mr. Smith,
or the Trial Court was without his address.
The Trial Court, while admitting it erred, attempts to place the blame for the
mistake on Chavez. Chavez was a pro se litigant who is entitled to leniency by the courts
when it comes to matters of procedure. See Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, \ 3, 67 P.3d
1000, 1003 (Utah 2003). The Trial Court, on the other hand, has vast amounts of legal
training and experience - blaming Chavez for the Court's error is inappropriate. It's
important to note, absent the Trial Court's error, there would be nothing for Chavez's
inexperience to perpetuate.
Additionally, none of the Court's averments, even assuming such were true,
warrant such a harsh sanction as the entry of a Default Judgment. The Court points to
Chavez's alleged failure to serve the Answer on opposing counsel and his alleged failure
to provide the Court with his address. '"[T]he law disfavors default judgments[.]"'
Davis v. Goldsworthy, 2008 UT App 145, f 10, 184 P.3d 626 (quoting Black's Title, Inc.
v. Utah State Ins. Dep't, 1999 UT App 330, If 5, 991 P.2d 607; citing Harrington v.
Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[DJefault judgment is an unusually
harsh sanction that should be meted out with caution[.]")); Wright, 941 P.2d at 649. This
is especially true when the party against whom such a harsh sanction is assessed is a
pro se litigant. See Lundahl, 2003 UT 11, \ 3.
7

Additionally, Chavez mailed the Answer to the Court. The Court could have
obtained Chavez's contact information from the return address on the envelope if
necessary.
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Combining the leniency afforded a pro se litigant, the strong presumption against
defaults and default judgments, the Trial Court's errors, and the minority of Chavez's
alleged mistakes, it becomes clear that the sanction of default and default judgment are
too severe for the circumstances. Accordingly, the Court should set aside the Default,
vacate the Default Judgment, and remand this matter for a determination on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Trial Court had no basis to enter the Default and/or the Default
Judgment. The Trial Court's denial of Chavez's Motion to Set Aside was, likewise, in
error. Accordingly, the entry of the Default should be set aside, the Default Judgment
should be vacated, and the Court should remand this matter for adjudication on the merits
of the parties' claims.
DATED this 20th day of January 2011.

Jaspn D. Boreh; Esc
Melanie J. Vartabedian, Esq.
Quinton J. Stephens, Esq.
BALLARD SPAHR LLP

Attorneys for Appellant and Defendant
Benjamin Chavez
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct of copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT BENJAMIN CHAVEZ was served to the following this 20th day of
January 2011, in the manner set forth below:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No.

, return receipt requested

David K. Smith, Esq.
6925 Union Park Center, #600
Midvale,UT 84047
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RAY SALAZAR,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF
APPELLANT BENJAMIN CHAVEZ

v.

Case No.: 20100722

BENJAMIN CHAVEZ,
and JOHN DOES I-V, inclusive,

District Court No.: 080917245

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG, ON JULY 29, 2010.

David K. Smith (#2993)
6925 Union Park Center, #600
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 566-3373
Facsimile: (801) 566-8763
Attorney for Appellee, Ray Salazar

Jason D. Boren (#7816)
Melanie J. Vartabedian (#10148)
Quinton J. Stephens (#12675)
Ballard Spahr LLP
One Utah Center, Suite 600
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2221
Telephone: (801-531-3000
Facsimile: (801)531-3001
Attorneys for Appellant, Benjamin Chavez
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Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(D)
[A] party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of
judgment under Rule 58A(d),
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a)
Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim;
an answer to a cross claim, if the answer contains a cross claim; a third party
complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned under the
provisions of Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a third party complaint is
served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a
reply to an answer or a third party answer.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(2)
Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from,
or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment.
UtahR. Civ. P. 55
Default.
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for eiffirmative relief is sought
has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is
made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment
for the amount claimed and costs against the defendant if:
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear ;
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that
can be made certain by computation.
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default
shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment
or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to
make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or
order such references as it deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry
of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside
in accordarjce with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule
apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a thirdDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof No judgment by
default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or agency
thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court.
5.

Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d)
Notice of judgment. A copy of the signed judgment shall be promptly served by
the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The time for filing a
notice of appeal is not affected by this requirement.

6.

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.
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September 22, 2008

I mrd Judicial District

A SEP 23 2008
To: Third Judicial District Court And David K. Smith esq.

By. J j ( ^ L T LAKE COUNTY
deputy Clerk

Re: Civil #080917245

My name is Benjamin J. Chavez and I am writing this in rebuttal of accused petition.
First of all I am disabled and unable to work, I am 52 years of age and suffered multiple
strokes in the year of 2007,1 am currently seeking social security benefits for relief of
my misfortune. Regarding the incident on July 3, 2008 , Mr. Salazar attacked me and my
vehicle with a brick, apparently he had cut his arm on my door lock. According to
witnesses involved, they had never seen me with a weapon of any kind. Mr. Salazar's
medical bills were covered by Medicaid. Mr. Salazar was not working during the time
nor had he worked all summer. He was simply ripping off all friends and or
acquaintances to support his drug and alcohol habit. I have several reputable witnesses to
testify to his actions that evening and to his dishonorable character. I would in turn like to
charge him with the damages incurred to my vehicle, the cost of retreiving my truck from
impound and the personal hardship I encountered of having to spend 8 days in jail. As I
said I do have 4 personal witnesses available and are willing to testify against Mr. Salazar
Sincerely: Benjamin J. Chavez
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H U B DISTRICT COURT*
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Third Judicial District

M S - 2 2010
SALT LAJ

RAY SALA2AR,

Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY IfBGICIOM

111

Deputy Clerk

V

vs.

BENJAMIN CHAVEZ,
Defendant.

Case No: 080917245
Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG
Date:
July 29, 2010

Oept

Before the Court is Defendant's motion to set aside default
judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED,
This action was initiated by Plaintiff on August 20, 2008. Summons
and Complaint were placed with a constable for service, but the
constable was unable to effect personal service because he was
informed by defendantfs mother that defendant had "moved";
defendantfs mother refused to provide additional information. See
Constable's Affidavit of Non-Service, attached as exhibit to
Plaintiff's motion for substituted [sic] service. Regardless of
the failed attempt at personal service, the Court's docket
and
case file show that on September 23, 2008 Defendant filed a brief,
pro se "answer" refuting Plaintiff's allegations.
By filing his "answer" Defendant submitted himself to the Court's
personal jurisdiction.
Defendant's "answer" was addressed to both the Court and Mr. Smith,
Plaintiff's;counsel. However, it appears that the defendant never
provided Mr. Smith with his answer. As a result, plaintiff and his
counsel remained unaware that an answer had been filed with the
Court. Plaintiff then filed his request for alternate service.
It's unclear why the Court granted the request for "substituted
service" given that the docket reflected that an answer had been
filed. Regardless of the reason, however, the Court did approve
the motion to serve by
publication and Plaintiff duly gave such
notice by publication in the Intermountain Commercial Record. Not
unexpectedly, Defendant did not respond to the notice by
publication. Accordingly, on August 26, 2009 Plaintiff moved for,
and was granted,
default judgment against Defendant. Again,
there is no explanation in the case record for why a default
certificate and default judgment were signed given that the docket
clearly showed that Defendant had filed an answer almost a year
earlier.
The fact that default judgment should not have been entered does
not, however, warrant setting it aside under the facts of this
case. By haying filed his answer in September 2008 Defendant was
on notice that there was a civil action against him in this Court.
Still the defendant (a) did not serve his answer on opposing
counsel, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) did
not include any contact information that would allow the Court
(and opposing counsel) the ability to get in touch with him so
prosecution of this case could proceed in a timely and appropriate
way; and (c) never attempted to inform the Court of his
Page 1
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Case No: 080917245 Date:

Jul 29, 2010

whereabouts or inquire about the status of the case in the nearly
two years since he filed his answer. Any person who is a party to
an action in court has a duty to keep the Court informed of his
whereabouts; this is something that Defendant utterly failed to
do. As a result, defendant bears significant responsibility for 4
perpetuating the Court's error.
Finally, defendant argues that he did not become aware of the
default judgment against him until March 29, 2010 when his criminal
defense counsel informed him of the judgment. However, defendant
acknowledges that once he was informed that there was a judgment
against himv- he failed to seek immediate relief from that judgment.
Instead, he chose to wait almost three full months until his
criminal case was resolved. Defendant should have brought to the
criminal Court's attention that a judgment already existed against
him in a related civil case. Defendant's decision not to do so was
based on strategic considerations in the crimincil case. However,
those considerations do not constitute "excusable neglect" under
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Furthermore, because Defendant was on
actual notice that there was an open civil case against him but
chose not to stay in contact with the Court, Defendant has failed
to persuade the Court that the judgment against him should be set
aside under R. 60(b)(6) (in the interest of jus]

Date
Judge DEN
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 080917245 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL:
84047
MAIL:

DAVID K SMITH 6925 UNION PARK CENTER STE 600 MIDVALE, UT
MELANIE J VARTABEDIAN 201 S MAIN ST STE 800 SALT LAKE CITY

UT 8 4 1 1 1

Date:

^llQ

<U&
Deputy Court Clerk

Page 1 (last)
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RUSSELL v. MARTELL

Utah

1193

Cite as 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984)

David RUSSELL and Eileen Russell,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v

Sterling B. MARTELL, dba Martell Holding Company, Grant C. Mills, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 18160.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 30, 1984.
Defendant sought reversal of an order
by the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, G. Hal Taylor, J., denying defendant's motion to set aside a default judgment which had been entered against him.
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that:
(1) even assuming that subparagraph of
the Rule of Civil Procedure providing for
relief from judgment for "(7) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment" was available to defendant, his undenied statements that he felt no
legal obligation to respond to plaintiffs'
claims supported the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to set $side the default
judgment entered against him; those statements of defendant evinced a complete indifference ]by him and negated any diligence on His part in pursuing the opportunity to defend, but (2) the default judgment
h;ad to be reversed because of the trial
court's failure to follow the applicable Rule
of Civil Procedure providing that, when
plaintiffs' claim is for other than a sum
certain or an amount that by cornputetion
can be made certain, judgment by default
may not be entered by the clerk of court
but must be ehtered by the court, which
rnay conduct such hearings and tike such
evidence as is necessary to determine the
damages.
Affirmed in part; reversed and renianded in part.
1. Appeal and Error <s=*982(l)
Judgment <§=3344
Btoad discretion is accorded the trial
court in ruling on relief from a judgment,

and the Supreme Court will reverse that
ruling only if it is clear that the trial court
abused its discretion. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 60(b).
2. Judgment <s=>345
Subparagraph 7 of the civil procedure
rule providing for relief from judgment for
"any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment" may not be
resorted to when the ground asserted for
relief falls within subparagraph 1, allowing
relief on the basis of "mistake, indvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect"; otherwise,
the three-month limitation imposed oh relief under subparagraph 1 would be averted. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b)(l, 7).
3. Judgment <®=*138(2)
Even assuming that subparagraph of
the Rule of Civil Procedure providing for
relief from judgment for "(7). any other
reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment" was available to defendant, his undenied statements that he felt no
legal obligation to respond to plaintiffs'
claims supported the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to set aside the default
judgment entered against him; those statements of defendant evinced a complete indifference by him and negated any diligence oh his part in pursuing the opportunity to defend. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
60(b)(7).
4. Attorney and Client <s^>77
Any neglect by defendant's attorney
was attributable to defendant through principles of agency.
5. Judgment <3P131
Default judgment entered against defendant had to be reversed because of the
trial court's failure to follow the applicable
Rule of Civil Procedure providing that,
when plaintiffs' claim is for other than a
sum certain or an amount that by computation can be made certain, judgment by default may not be entered by the clerk of
court but must be entered by the court,
which may conduct such hearings and take
such evidence as is necessary to determine
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the damages.
Rules Civ.Proc,
55(b)(2); U.C.A. 1953, 61-l-22(l)(b).

Rule

6. Judgment <s=>131
Courts are not at liberty to deviate
from the Rules of Civil Procedure governing entry of judgment against a defaulting
party just because one party is in default
and is not entitled to be heard on the merits
of the case.
Ralph J. Marsh, David B. Boyce, Salt
Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
Earl D. Tanner, David Eccles Hardy, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.
HOWE, Justice:
Appellant Grant C. Mills seeks the reversal of the trial court's denial of his motion
to set aside a default judgment which had
been entered against him.
Oh July 7, 1981 Mills was served with a
summons and a copy of the plaintiffs' complaint. When he did not file an answer in
response, his default was entered by the
court. After an ex parte hearing on a
motion made by plaintiffs for judgment,
judgment was granti&i for $63,200, attorney's fees of $5,000 and costs, of the action.
In December of 1981 Mills filed a motion to
set aside the default judgment supported
by affidavits. Plaintiffs, David Russell
and Eileen Russell, also filed affidavits in
opposition to the motion.
In his affidavit, Mills claimed to have
sent Ms summons and copy of the complaint to his attorney to be handled by him.
He was located in another city and was
also representing other co-defendants in
this case. The attorney, because of confusion in his office, failed to file an answer in
Mills' behalf. After a writ of execution
was issued against his property in November, Mills retained another attorney who
filed the motion to set aside the judgment.
Mills claimed that he had not taken action
more quickly because he had relied upon
representations of the clerk of the court
who he telephoned that no judgment had
been entered against him.

On the other hand, Mr. Russell swore
that on July 15 Mills informed him that he
intended to take no action on the summons
and complaint. In an affidavit by Russell's
attorney, he stated that on August 18 he
informed Mills in a telephone conversation
that a default judgment had been taken
against him. Mills replied that he felt no
legal obligation to Russell and did not feel
motivated by the lawsuit to address Russell's claims. Neither of these statements
was denied by Mills.
Upon review of the affidavits, the trial
court denied Mills' motion to set aside the
judgment, An order to stay the execution
of Mills' property pending this appeal was
entered thereafter.
I.
Mills' first point is that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to set
aside the default judgment. Rule 60(b) of
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for relief from a judgment, states in
pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the dourt may in the furtherance of
justice relieve^ a party or his legal representative frohV a filial judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertaitee, surprise, or excusable neglect;
. . . or (7) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within
a reasonable time and for [reason] (1) . . .
not more than three months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
Mills claims that the circumstances here do
not fall within subparagraph (1), with
whose three month time limitation he did
not comply. Rather, he argues, the judgment should have been set aside under
subparagraph (7) since despite his diligence
he failed to timely answer the complaint.
[1] Broad discretion is accorded the trial court in ruling on relief from a judgment; and, this Court will reverse that
ruling only if it is clear the trial court
abused its discretion. Valley Leasing v.
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Houghton, Utah, 661 P.2d 959 (1983);
Heath v. Mower, Utah, 597 R2d 855 (1979);
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30
Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973).
[2] We have held that subparagraph 7
may not be resorted to for relief when the
ground asserted for relief falls within subparagraph 1. Pitts v. McLachlan, Utah,
567 P.2d 171 (1977); Calder Bros. Co. v.
Anderson, Utah, 652 P.2d 922 (1982);
Laub v. South Central Telephone Ass'n,
Utah, 657 P.2d 1304 (1982); Gardiner &
Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, Utah, 656
P.2d 429 (1982). Otherwise, the three
month limitation imposed on relief under
subparagraph 1 is averted.
[3,4] However, even assuming that
subparagraph 7 is available to Mills, his
undenied statements that he felt no legal
obligation to respond to the plaintiffs'
claims support the trial court's denial of his
motion. Those statements evince a complete indifference by him and negate any
diligence on his part in pursuing the opportunity to defend. Further, any neglect by
Mills' attorney is attributable to Mills
through principles of agency. Gardiner &
Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, supra. We
find under these facts hd abuse of discretion^ by the trial court in denying relief
froni the judgment;
II. . . . ..,V,.Y.
[5,6] Although we will not disturb the
default of Mills, we, dp hold under the authority of Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch,
Jnc.,Vtah,m^^
Enterprises, Inc. v. $a,ef, Utah, 604 VM
486 (1979), that the judgment against Mills
must be reversed because of the failure of
the trial court to follow Rule 55(b)(2) of the
tftah Rules of Ciyil Procedure. Rule
S4(c)(2) and Rule 55 prescribes the procedure to be followed by trial courts in entering judgments against defaulting parties.
Courts are not at liberty to deviate from
those rules just because one party is in
default and is not entitled to be heard on
the merits of the case. For example. Rule
54(c)(2)/ provides that a judgment by default
may not be different in kind from or exceed

in amount that specifically prayed for in
the demand for judgment. See Hayes v.
Towles, 95 Idaho 208, 506 P.2d 105 (1973).
Another rule governing the entry of default judgments is Rule 55(b)(2), which is
applicable in the instant case. It provides
that when the plaintiffs claim is fpr other
than a sum certain or an amount that by
computation can be made certain judgment
by default may not be entered by the clerk
of the court, but must be entered by the
court, which may conduct such hearings
and take such evidence as is necessary to
determine the damages. In the instant
case, plaintiffs seek damages under U.C.A.,
1953, § 61-l-22(l)(b), part of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, which provides that an
aggrieved party may
[R]ecover the consideration paid for the
security, together with interest at 8% per
year from the date of payment, co^ts,
and reasonable attorney's fees, less the
amount of any income received on the
security, upon the tender of the security
or for damages if he no longer owns the
security.
According to the plaintiffs' complaint, Mills
acted as a securities agent without having
been registered, and he made untrue representations to the plaintiffs concerning the
security pledged to. secure the note in violation of our Securities Act. The promissory
note that he sold the plaintiffs was for
$48,000 principal. It was due in six months
at which time $7,200 in interest would accrue, making a total of $55,200 due. However, it is not alleged in the complaint that
$48,000 was paid for the note and under
the statute plaintiffs are limited to the recovery of the consideration paid for the
security. That being the case, the plaintiffs' claims for damages against Mills
were not for sums certain and under Rule
55(b)(2) a hearing should have been conducted by the trial court to ascertain the
amount of the damages to which the plaintiffs were entitled. Furthermore,' under
§ 61-l~22(l)(b), evidence should have been
adduced as to the amount of income, if any,
the plaintiffs had received on the security
(which Mills claims was ^$16,800) so that it
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could be deducted in the calculation of the
plaintiffs' damages. Although it appears
that a hearing was held, it dealt only with
the reasonableness of the attorney's fees to
be awarded the plaintiffs.
The judgment below is reversed on this
point, and the case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings in conformity
with this opinion. No costs on appeal are
awarded.

schedules in effect from time to time as
determined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

1. Electricity <3=>11.5(1)
Utah Public Service Commission had
jurisdiction over parties to controversy between cooperative power association, which
received financing from the Rural Electrification Administration, obtained electric
power from its own generation facilities in
Utah and from other sources including generation facilities in Arizona, and which
made wholesale sales of electric power to
public utility distributing power at retail to
Utah and Arizona consumers, and the public utility, which was not a member of the
cooperative association, concerning a refund by association to public utility, whqse
rates for payment of the sold electric power were tied to Utah power and light.company rate schedules, $fter the Federal Energy Regulatory; Commission ordered a reduction of Utah power and Jight's wholesale rates and a refund based thereon.

GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, a
Rural Electric Cooperative, plaintiff,
v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, Miily O. Bernard, David R. Irvine and Brent H. Cameron, Commissioners of the Public Service Commission of Utah, Division of Public Utilities and CP National, Defendants.
No. 17461.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 11, 1984.

Order affirmed.
Stewart, J., filed concurring opinion.
Durham, J., filed concurring and dissenting opinion.
See also Utah, 627 P.2d 71.

2. Electricity <s=*11.5(l)
Utah Public Service Commission did
not exceed its statutory authority in ordering Cooperative association, from whom
public utility purchased Wholesale sales of
electric power, to refund $161,568.90 to
public utility, where rates charged by cooperative association for the wholesale sales
df electric power were tied to rate schedules of Utah power and light company and
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had ordered a reduction in the Utah
power and light wholesale rates and a refund as a result of the reduction. U.C.A.
1953, 54-4-1, 54-7-20.

Cooperative association, which made
wholesale sales of electric power to public
utility, sought writ of review of a report
and order of the Public Service Commission
requiring that cooperative association refund money received from the wholesale
sales. The Supreme Court held that: (1)
Public Service Commission had jurisdiction
over the parties in the case, and (2) Commission did not exceed its statutory authority in ordering a refund or in finding that
the -4 contracts between cooperative association and public utility adopted as the eon- 3. Public Utilities <s=>120
tract rates for the wholesale sales of elecUtah Public Service Commission may
tric power the Utah public and light rate order reparation for charges made by a
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